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Abstract
Asset mis-pricing may reflect investor psychology, with excess volatil-
ity arising from switches of sentiment. For a floating exchange rate
where fundamentals follow a random walk, we show that excess volatil-
ity can be generated by the repeated entry and exit of currency ‘bulls’
and ‘bears’ with switches driven by ‘draw-down’ trading rules. We ar-
gue that non-sterilised intervention – in support of ‘monitoring band’
– can reduce excess volatility by coordinating beliefs in line with pol-
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1 Introduction
When the euro was created in 1999 some economists predicted that it would
rise strongly from its launch value of $1.18 as it challenged the dollar’s posi-
tion as the world’s key reserve currency.1 The euro bulls were disappointed,
however, as the new currency steadily lost value – perhaps because Asian
countries lost faith in the IMF and turned to the dollar as a substitute. When
the euro fell to 83 cents in September 2000, coordinated Central Bank inter-
vention was implemented to stop the slide. A famously incautious remark
by the then head of ECB2 led to further weakness (with the euro falling to
its historic minimum a month later), but the euro stabilized around 90 cents
(Figure 1). From early 2002, the currency experienced a reversal that was
to take it well above the launch price, reaching a peak of $1.36 near the end
of 2004. Currently, with the euro standing close to $1.30, there is talk of
further dollar devaluation to help reduce the US deficit.
The substantial – and surprising – gyrations in the euro/dollar rate have
led to calls for the publication of sustainable or ‘equilibrium exchange rates’.
John Williamson for example has suggested that this would be an appropri-
ate initiative for the IMF which – as part of its new medium term strategy
– aims to involve itself more closely with the affairs of G8 countries. It has
been officially argued, however, that any such steps would be unattractive
– even embarrassing – for the ECB and the Fed, neither of which have the
exchange rate as a policy target. Both players reserve the right to intervene
at values which they may judge to be inappropriate: save for such ad hoc
intervention, things should be left to market forces.
How will market forces operate if there is asymmetric information in
firms trading foreign currency, and heterogeneity in the type of trader to
whom portfolio management is delegated? Can intervention help in these
circumstances? These are the questions addressed in this paper.
In financial markets where asset management is delegated to agents with
private information, traders will typically be subject to monitoring rules.
When trades involve signalling the quality of the trader as well as the asset,
Dasgupta and Prat (2005, 2006) have shown that even traders who are
1Bergsten (1997) and Portes and Rey (1998) for example.
2When asked whether a slump in currencies caused by a war in the Middle East might
lead central banks to intervene in the markets, Mr Duisenberg said, “I wouldn’t think so”.
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Figure 1: The value of the Euro since its launch in Jan 1999. Source: ECB.
being optimally monitored will fail to push prices to equilibrium; though
they begin trading sincerely, they will eventually ‘follow the herd’. With
ad hoc monitoring rules, the risk of market inefficiency is much greater, as
Grossman and Zhou (1993) show for ‘draw-down rules’ that involve firing
traders who lose more than a given percent of previous peak value for the
assets under management.
Asset mis-pricing may reflect investor psychology, with excess volatility
arising from switches of sentiment, as Barberis et al (1998) have argued with
respect to the equity market. Like them, we postulate two types of trader
in the foreign exchange market – ‘bulls’ and ‘bears’ – each with a distinct
psychological bias in forming expectations. For a floating exchange rate
where fundamentals follow a random walk, we show how excess volatility
can be generated by the repeated entry and exit of currency ‘bulls’ and
‘bears’ where the switches are driven by a ‘draw-down’ rule as in Grossman
and Zhou (1993).3
In this simple model we show how official intervention can reduce ex-
cess volatility.4 The intervention we discuss involves changing fundamen-
tals by non-sterilised intervention if and when the rate moves outside what
3An alternative approach where trading rules are selected using a fitness criterion is
explored by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and Kubelec (2004).
4See Krugman and Miller (1992) for a similar argument in connection with target zones.
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Williamson has labelled ‘monitoring bands’. We argue that the trend that
this introduces into fundamentals will help stabilise the rate directly via its
effects on selecting between bulls and bears.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we show how the entry and
exit of bulls and bears changes the behaviour of an exchange rate driven
by random walk fundamentals. In Section 3 we see how the ‘churning’ of
traders can generate excess volatility. Can this excess volatility – induced
by trading strategies and noisy fundamentals – be reduced by implementing
a monitoring band? In Section 4 we show that non-sterilised intervention,
by its effects in selecting between bulls and bears, can reduce exchange rate
volatility. Before concluding, there is a brief discussion of the coordination
role of sterilised currency intervention in the context of strategic comple-
mentarity.
2 A one-time switch between ‘bears’ and ‘bulls’
In Barberis et al (1998), a representative risk neutral investor is assumed
to switch between two ‘sentiments’ in respect to stock earnings – trend ex-
trapolation and mean-reversion. While earnings actually follow a random
walk, the investor switches between these sentiments based on runs of data
from markets. Here it is the psychological forces of conservatism and rep-
resentativeness operating on the ultimate wealth owner that play a key role
in updating beliefs.
Our focus is on funds under management, however, so the operative
mechanism is the set of rules governing currency traders in a situation of
asymmetric information between principal and agent5. We assume there
are two types of traders to whom currency portfolio management may be
delegated – ‘bulls’ who are optimistic about the trend-value of domestic
currency and ‘bears’ who are pessimistic.
In the absence of official intervention, fundamentals are assumed to fol-
low a random walk:
dx = σdW,
5The approach we have adopted applies to equities as well, as wealth owners commonly
leave funds under management for investment by equity traders: indeed the draw-down
rules we use are discussed by Grossman and Zhou with respect to equity investment.
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where W is a standard Wiener process and σ the instantaneous standard
deviation. But ‘bulls’ and ‘bears’ are subject to psychological biases in
forming their expectations: their anticipated future exchange rates deviate
from rational expectations.6
Bulls consistently over-estimate and bears always under-predict the trend
in exchange rates. Specifically, we assume domestic currency bulls will add a
fixed appreciation premium to the mathematical expectation of the exchange
rate change, despite fundamentals following random walk, so:
EOdu/dt = Edu/dt+ µ, (1)
where u represents the (log) price of domestic currency in terms of foreign
currency,7 EO indicates ‘optimistic’ expectations of euro bulls, E the ra-
tional expectations and µ the appreciation premium. Similarly, the change
in the exchange rate expected by bears will lie below its mathematical ex-
pectation change by a term that represents their bearishness for domestic
currency, which for convenience we also assume to be µ:8
EPdu/dt = Edu/dt− µ,
where EP represents pessimistic expectations of the bears.
At any given time, only one type of trader will populate the market. So
our bullishness and bearishness resemble the two sentiments postulated in
Barberis et al (1998). But while they postulate changes of sentiment on the
part of ultimate wealth holders, we assume assets under management are
switched between bulls and bears in response to public signals: when losses
from some previous market peak hit the limit set by a ‘draw-down’ rule, for
example, as in Grossman and Zhou (1993). If draw-down rules are the same
across the market then the market as a whole will switch at once, so traders
at any point of time will be homogenous – which is what we assume. Note
that in both our model and that of Barberis et al (1998), it is the change of
beliefs not the trading of assets which affects prices.
6Much of the psychological biases associated with how people form expectations were
summarised in Barberis and Thaler (2003).
7In this paper, we take euro as the domestic currency and dollar the foreign currency.
8The ‘observational equivalence’ between trend expectation and risk aversion is noted
further below.
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Figure 2: Misalignment and volatility with a one-time switch.
If bulls were permanently in the market, the arbitrage condition for the
exchange rates is simply:
1
2
σ2u
′′
O(x) + µ =
1
β
(uO(x)− x), (2)
where subscript O represents bulls. With no-bubble-condition, (2) has the
solution:
uO(x) = x+ βµ. (3)
So with bulls permanently in the market, exchange rates would have a mis-
alignment of βµ. (Likewise, the exchange rates with bears permanently in
the market are given by uP (x) = x−βµ, where subscript P indicates bears.)
Figure 2 illustrates how the presence of bears and bulls affects exchange
rates. Using the horizontal axis to represent fundamentals and vertical the
exchange rate, the 45◦ line FF represents the fundamental value for ex-
change rates when x follows a random walk (with µ = 0). The lines OO
(denoting optimism) and PP (denoting pessimism) indicate respectively the
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outcomes if local currency bulls or bears are permanently in the market. No-
tice that, without switching, the volatility of exchange rates is not affected
in either case.
How will switching between trader types impact on exchange rates and
currency volatility? To start with the exchange rate effect, assume that
for high values of u only euro-bulls will be in the market: but they will be
replaced by euro-bears if and when the value of u falls to −u¯. Symmetrically,
only euro-bears will be in the market for low u, with a switch in market
composition at u¯. On these assumptions, the solutions for the exchange
rates (formally derived in Appendix A) are as shown in Figure 2.
The concave curve HA represents solution for bulls who expect to be
driven out of the market at A. The exit of bulls at A is locally irreversible,
so only value-matching applies. As there are no bears in the market for
exchange rates above u¯ and the prospect of a switch declines for higher
values of fundamentals, the bulls’ solution approaches OO asymptotically.
(The exchange rate under bears is sketched symmetrically, shown by the
convex curve LB.) It is clear from the figure that within the bounds of −u¯
and u¯, exchange rates exhibit hysteresis: if bulls are in the market, they
will stay there until −u¯ is reached (vice versa for the bears). Note that this
switch generates significant persistence in exchange rate misalignment : take
the bulls’ solution for example, as long as x is sufficiently larger than x¯,
uO(x)− x ≈ βµ.
As the instantaneous volatility of the exchange rate is measured by the
absolute value of its slope, there will be excess volatility with entry and
exit. This is clear from the convex solution for bears which, while asymp-
totic to PP as x tends to −∞, increases monotonically as x approaches
x¯ from below. The reason why the anticipated switch adds to volatility is
easy to see. Starting at L, for example, where the market is dominated by
euro-pessimists, consider an increase in the variable x, representing funda-
mentals; the euro will increase in value both for fundamental reasons and
also because the market anticipates that the euro-bears are more likely to
lose their jobs. As can be seen from Figure 3, volatility for bears is every-
where larger than one and reaches a maximum at x¯, the point of switching.
Likewise for bulls, volatility reaches its maximum as x approaches −x¯ from
above. With repeated switches, misalignment is reduced but volatility stays
high, as shown in the next section.
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Figure 3: Exchange rate volatility with one-time switch between bull and
bears.
3 Repeated switching of traders
Consider exchange rate behaviour when traders are fired and hired repeat-
edly under a draw-down rule. Formal results derived in Appendix B are
illustrated in Figure 4. Exchange rates must lie between the two lines la-
belled uLI and uUI each representing a “switching boundary”. Consider two
solutions lying between fundamental values of y and z, which act as triggers
for firing and hiring as the vertical distance of 2u¯ between the exchange
rates L and H corresponds to the draw-down rule of Grossman and Zhou
(1993). Thus the concave solution, labelled uRO , shows the outcome for the
exchange rate when traders are all euro-bulls who fear losing their jobs at L
where fundamentals have moved against the euro in favour of the dollar. By
symmetry, the solution uRP shows how the exchange rate will behave when
trades are being conducted by euro-bears fearing to lose their jobs at H.
Together these segments describe a range of hysteresis rather like that
observed in the one-time switching case shown in the previous figure. The
difference here is that – when fundamentals move sufficiently in the direction
predicted by current traders – these line segments will simply slide between
the switching boundaries to which they ‘smooth-paste’ as shown in the fig-
ure.9 At H for example, with bulls in charge, a positive shock will lead to
the concave segments sliding up along the switching boundary. A negative
9In particular, the convex uRP smooth pastes line uLI at point L and concave u
R
O smooth
pastes line uUI at point H. For the rules of “the art of smooth-pasting”, see Dixit (1994).
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Figure 4: Excess volatility with repeated switching.
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shock involves no sliding, however, as the rate moves down along uRO.
The smooth-pasting reflects the fact that traders do not lose their jobs
if the rate moves in the direction that they have been forecasting; and the
sliding reflects the shifting of the trigger for the draw-down rule as a new
currency peak is realized. The switching boundaries uUI and uLI lie inside
PP and OO because traders are never sure to keep their jobs. At point H
on uUI for instance, euro-bulls are in place, but they are not permanently
in place: they expect to lose their jobs if fundamentals move sufficiently
against the dollar (for example, to point L).
Since both uRO and u
R
P are steeper than 45
◦, except at the extremities
where they smooth-paste, we conclude:
Proposition 1 For repeated switching, there is excess volatility of exchange
rates almost everywhere.
The exchange rate effects of repeated switching between bulls and bears
as shown in Figure 4 closely resembles that described in Krugman and Miller
(1993, Figure A2) where the switching is between risk averse wealth owners
and risk neutral stop loss traders subject to draw-down rules. This is not
coincidence: it reflects the fact that, in the stochastic framework we are using
here, risk aversion manifest itself as a trend. This ‘observational equivalence’
means that one may be able to apply the results we obtain here to the case
where heterogeneity reflects risk preferences and not optimism or pessimism
per se.
4 A monitoring band with non-sterilised interven-
tion
So far our analysis of the foreign exchange market has run closely parallel to
Barberis et al (1998) for equities. While fundamentals follow a random walk,
agents choose between two contrasting beliefs or ‘models’ of fundamentals –
neither of which is strictly rational; and excess volatility arises from random
switching between these beliefs based on runs of data from the market.
In this section, we turn to a phenomenon relatively common in foreign
exchange markets but not in equity markets, namely official stabilising in-
tervention as a matter of public policy. With non-sterlised intervention, the
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stance of monetary policy can be adjusted to stabilise the exchange rate –
tightening money to strengthen the currency when it is too weak, easing to
lower its external value. In the case of what Williamson (1998) has called
‘monitoring bands’, stabilising action to push the rate towards a defined
equilibrium will be taken when rates lie outside the band, with no action
taken close to equilibrium within the band. Unlike a ‘target zone’, therefore,
this soft buffer is perfectly consistent with rates lying outside the monitoring
band. But monetary fundamentals will be affected: instead of following a
pure random walk, they will incorporate stabilising trends.
How, if at all, might this affect trading rules and the selection of bulls
versus bears? Within the band, where fundamentals follow a random walk,
there need be no effect; so the draw-down rules discussed previously could
well continue in operation. But outside the band intervention will, in prin-
ciple, move fundamentals closer to one of the two views. If the euro is too
strong for example, an easing of monetary policy will mean euro bulls are
betting against the trend in fundamentals, while euro bears are going with
the flow. In these circumstances, it seems probable that trading rules would
be adjusted to be more accommodating to those whose beliefs are consistent
with the fundamentals inclusive of intervention; and tougher on those who
are not. Instead of trying to model in detail how to endogenise the trading
rules, we simply assume that, outside the band, traders whose beliefs are
more consistent with fundamentals are selected by those with funds under
management. This means that bears are selected when the strength of the
euro leads to monetary easing – and bulls when monetary policy is tightened
to help the currency when weak; as we see below, stabilising intervention
acquires added force if market sentiment moves in line with policy in this
fashion.
To study the effects of implementing a monitoring band along the line
advocated by Williamson (1998), we adopt the following assumptions:
(i) The monitoring band – within which there is no intervention – lies
symmetrically around the origin with half-width u¯: i.e., the size of the mon-
itoring band is the same as that of the draw-down rule.10
(ii) Non-sterilised “mean-reverting” intervention occurs outside these
limits and is publicly observed. For concreteness we assume that above u¯ an
intervention in the form of a negative trend of −µdt is applied to fundamen-
10This convenient assumption avoids ‘churning’ inside the monitoring band.
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Figure 5: Entry and exit of bulls and bears with a monitoring band.
tals, and conversely a positive trend of µdt below −u¯. Note, however, policy
could take the form of randomized intervention with the same expected
value.11
(iii) Following the above discussion, intervention is associated with se-
lection of bulls or bears depending the its direction: so at u¯ (and above)
bears are selected and at −u¯ (and below) bulls are selected.
The formal results in Appendix C are illustrated in Figure 5, where the
convex schedule ABH indicates the solution when traders are euro-bears and
concave LAB when trades are being carried out by euro-bulls. Note that
outside the monitoring band there are no switches and the traders in place
have beliefs that coincide with official policy of ‘mean-reverting’ intervention.
As there is no intervention inside the band, the convex segmentsHB and BA
11Note that the non-sterilised intervention which adds a negative trend −µdt to the
fundamentals corresponds to monetary expansion: and a positive trend to monetary con-
traction. For simplicity, the trend intervention is set equal to the expectations bias of
traders.
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Figure 6: Exchange rate volatility with entry and exit of bull and bears
under a monitoring band.
value-match and smooth-paste at B, where the stochastic process changes.
The linked solution segments uMP and u
M
O value-match at the top and at the
bottom of the band (at the fundamental triggers ±x¯). They are therefore
a good deal flatter than the sliding segments in the previous section. This
may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 With a credible monitoring band, the volatility of exchange
rates is everywhere less than one.
To see this, note that as ABH is convex and asymptotically approaches
x − 2βµ when x → ∞, the slope of ABH is everywhere less than 1. This
implies that excess volatility for the bear’s solution with monitoring band
is substantially reduced, indicating the stabilizing power of the monitoring
band. The same argument applies to the exchange rate solution for bulls
LAB.
That short run volatilities lie everywhere below 1 in the presence of non-
sterilised intervention is shown in Figure 6. Although intervention only takes
place outside the band, volatility is always lower inside the band. This is
because of expected switches between bulls and bears.
Our results involve a good deal of hysteresis: we believe this is largely
due to the assumption that the draw-down rule matches the size of the
band. The effect of varying the size of the draw-down rule remains to be
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explored.12
5 A role for sterilised intervention?
What about sterilised intervention, where the stance of monetary policy is
left unchanged? Even when macroeconomic fundamentals are unchanged,
sterilised intervention can make a difference if strategic complementarity is
a feature of the market (i.e., where it is tempting to buy when you believe
others will do the same), as pointed out by Obstfeld (1996) in discussing
speculative attacks on a currency peg.
Applying the logic of global games to the foreign exchange market –
with many small traders with private information on fundamentals – Mor-
ris and Shin (1998) found that equilibrium will be unique. The presence
of large players can nevertheless affect the behaviour of the market as a
whole, as shown by Corsetti et al (2004) and Frankel et al (2003). Taking
as an example, provision of liquidity support by the IMF to countries under
exchange rate pressure, Corsetti et al (2006) conclude that “Limited contin-
gent liquidity support helps to prevent liquidity runs by raising the number
of investors willing to lend to the country for any given fundamentals, i.e.,
it can have catalytic effects.”
Are these appropriate micro-foundations for the “coordination channel”
of sterilised intervention discussed in Sarno and Taylor (2001, 2002)? Note
that for such coordination benefits to materialize, it must be common knowl-
edge that there will be official intervention at some point. (In a more general
setting where homogenous traders possess private information and type of
the policy-maker is uncertain, Angeletos et al (2006) show that raising and
lowering interest rates may still play a coordinating role – by acting as a
signal of policy-maker’s type.)
6 Conclusions
Traders may have different models or beliefs about the prospects for a cur-
rency; and trading rules which generate repeated switches between bulls and
12In the limiting case analysed Corrado et al (2002) where draw-down rule is arbitrarily
small, hysteresis disappears.
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bears can cause excess volatility in the foreign exchange market. Official in-
tervention can have self-fulfilling properties if it can appropriately affect
traders choice of belief. This has been shown in a setting with heterogenous
traders and a publicly-announced policy of non-sterilised intervention. Note,
however, that this involves assigning monetary policy to external targets al-
beit on a state-contingent basis.
In a setting where traders are distinguished not by heterogenous beliefs
but by idiosyncratic information, it has been shown that sterilised interven-
tion can play a coordinating role. To get the benefits from coordination
in such a global game setting, it appears that a Central Bank must either
announce ex-ante its willingness to intervene as a big player, or it must be
ready to use interest rates aggressively in order to signal its type. Neither
of these seems true of the stance of policy for the euro or the dollar at the
time of writing: but things might well change if China chooses to diversify
its reserve holdings.
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Appendix
A One-Time Switching
For the exposition in the text, we assume a relatively large draw-down rule,
u¯ > βµ. With bulls in the market (i.e., u(x) ≥ −u¯), the exchange rate is a
solution to (2):
uO(x) = x+ βµ+A+ exp(λx) +A− exp(−λx), (A.1)
where A± are two arbitrary constants to be determined by boundary condi-
tions. When bears are in the market, the arbitrage condition is characterized
by
1
2
σ2u
′′
P (x)− µ =
1
β
(uP (x)− x), for u ≤ u¯
which permits the following general solution
uP (x) = x− βµ+B+ exp(λx) +B− exp(−λx). (A.2)
To determine completely the solutions for the entry and exit, we specify
the following boundary conditions. Note first that, when u > u¯, there are
only bulls in the market. So for u → ∞, we must have the asymptotic
condition
lim
x→∞uO(x)→ x+ βµ, (A.3)
and likewise,
lim
x→−∞uP (x)→ x− βµ. (A.4)
Applying (A.3) and (A.4) to (A.1) and (A.2) respectively yields A+ = B− =
0.
Assume that entries (and exits) are anticipated, and denote the fun-
damental trigger for the entry of bears (and exit of bulls) by −x¯, then
no-arbitrage implies the following value matching condition
uO(−x¯) = −u¯ = −x¯− βµ (A.5)
By symmetry,
uP (x¯) = u¯ = x¯+ βµ (A.6)
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Solving (A.1) subject to (A.5) yields the solution for bulls
uO(x) = x+ βµ− 2βµ exp[−λ(x+ x¯)], x ≥ −x¯, (A.7)
The solution for bears is
uP (x) = x− βµ+ 2βµ exp[λ(x− x¯)], x ≤ x¯, (A.8)
and the entry or exit trigger can be determined by
x¯ = u¯− βµ. (A.9)
B Repeated Switching
Let uU and uL denote respectively exchange rates when bulls and bears are
permanently in place, then
uU = x+ βµ
uL = x− βµ.
These solutions correspond to OO and PP in Figure 4. The upper and
lower envelopes for repeated switching, denoted by uUI and uLI , will lie in
the interior of uU and uL. Specifically, let them be:
uUI = x+ βµ
′
uLI = x− βµ′
where 0 < µ
′
< µ and µ
′
need to be determined.
Let uRO and u
R
P be the solutions for bulls and bears subject to switching,
then:
uRO = x+ βµ+D+e
λx +D−e−λx
uRP = x− βµ+A+eλx +A−e−λx
where D± and A± depend on the switching point y but µ
′
and ∆x = z − y
are independent from it. Because of symmetry we only need to solve for uRO.
Since bulls are expected to leave the market when fundamentals reach
point y, one condition to be imposed is value matching at L:
uRO(y) = uLI(y). (B.1)
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Bulls solution around point H has features that: following a positive
shock to the fundamental at z, it slides along the upper envelope uUI reset-
ting the reference for the draw-down rule to the new peak reached; after a
negative shock, it simply moves down along uRO to the left. Since there is
no change of market composition, uRO value-matches and smooth pastes the
upper envelope at H:
uRO(y +∆x) = uUI(y +∆x) (B.2)
and
∂uRO(z)/∂z|z=y+∆x = 1. (B.3)
From (B.2), (B.3) and (B.1):
cosh(λ∆x) =
2(µ+ µ
′
)
µ− µ′ . (B.4)
Since it takes 2u¯ to switching we derive µ
′
from the following condition:
uUI(y +∆x)− uLI(y) = ∆x+ 2βµ′ = 2u¯ (B.5)
whereas ∆x is derived by replacing µ
′
in (B.4) using (B.5):13
cosh(λ∆x) =
2(2βµ+ 2u¯−∆x)
2βµ− 2u¯+∆x , (B.6)
where 0 < ∆x < 2u¯+ 2βµ.
For a given y and ∆x determined by (B.6), one can represent bulls
solution in the region y ≤ x ≤ y +∆x by
uRO(x; y) = x+ βµ−
2βµ− 2u¯+∆x
2
cosh[λ(x− y −∆x)]. (B.7)
It can be easily shown that uRO given in (B.7) is concave. Following the
similar procedure, one can derive uRP and show it is convex.
13Note that the RHS of (B.6) is decreasing in ∆x and the LHS increasing in ∆x thus
defining a unique solution.
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C Monitoring Bands and Monitoring Rules
Because of the symmetry of the monitoring band and the interventions, the
fundamental triggers beyond which intervention policy is implemented will
be symmetric. Denote these trigger by −x¯ and x¯. Inside the monitoring
band (−x¯ ≤ x ≤ x¯) either bulls or bears can be in the market. The solution
for bulls inside the monitoring band can be written as
uNO (x) = x+ βµ+A
N
+ exp(λx) +A
N
− exp(−λx). (C.1)
For x < −x¯, official intervention with positive trend to the fundamental
is applied. This implies that only bulls are in the market. The arbitrage
condition for exchange rates becomes
1
2
σ2u
′′
O(x) + µu
′
O(x) + µ =
1
β
[uO(x)− x], (C.2)
which permits a solution of
uIO(x) = x+ 2βµ+A
I
+ exp(ξ+x) +A
I
− exp(ξ−x), (C.3)
where ξ± = (µ±
√
µ2 + 2σ2/β)/σ2, and superscripts Nand I represent with
and without intervention respectively.
At x¯, bulls are fired, only value matching condition applies
uIO(−x¯) = u¯.
At −x¯, value matching and smooth pasting conditions apply
uNO (−x¯) = uIO(−x¯) = −u¯,
duNO (−x¯)/dx = duIO(−x¯)/dx.
As in the previous section, similar asymptotic condition applies to x < −x¯,
i.e.,
lim
x→−∞u
N
O (x)→ x+ 2βµ.
These boundary conditions imply a fixed point equation for x¯:
βµ = (u¯+ 2βµ− x¯)1 + cosh(2λx¯) + (ξ+/λ) sinh(2λx¯)
3 + cosh(2λx¯)
, (C.4)
which has a unique solution 0 < x¯ < u¯+ 2βµ.
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Given x¯ from (C.4), one can then solve for the coefficients in (C.1) and
(C.3):
AI− = 0,
AI+ = (x¯− u¯− 2βµ) exp(ξ+x¯),
AN− =
βµ+ (1− ξ+/λ)(x¯− u¯− 2βµ)
2
exp(−λx¯),
AN+ =
βµ+ (1 + ξ+/λ)(x¯− u¯− 2βµ)
2
exp(λx¯).
So exchange rates under bulls are
uMO (x) =

x+ βµ+ (x¯− u¯− 2βµ)(cosh[λ(x+ x¯)] + (ξ+/λ) sinh[λ(x+ x¯)])
+βµ cosh[λ(x+ x¯)], for −x¯ ≤ x ≤ x¯,
x+ 2βµ+ (x¯− u¯− 2βµ) exp[ξ+(x+ x¯)], for x < −x¯.
The solution above is indeed concave.
By symmetry, the solution for the bears can be constructed as
uiP (x) = −uiO(−x), i = N, I. (C.5)
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